While outlining his vision of The New Statistics, Cumming (2014) proposes that a more rigorous and cumulative psychological science will be built, in part, by having psychologists abandon traditional null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) approaches, and conducting small-scale meta-analyses on their data whenever possible. In the present paper, I propose an alternative system for conducting rigorous and replicable psychological investigations, which I describe as Exploring Small, Confirming Big. I begin with a critical evaluation of the merits of NHST and small-scale meta-analyses, and argue that NHST does have a valuable role in the scientific process, whereas small-scale meta-analyses will do little to advance a cumulative science. I then present an overview of an alternative system for producing cumulative and replicable psychological research: Exploring Small, Confirming Big. It involves a two-step process to psychological research, consisting of: (1) Recent investigations into the replicability of psychological science, as well as high profile unveilings of fraud, have placed our discipline-and many others-in a state of somber introspection. The issues of fraud (Crocker & Cooper, 2011; Simonsohn, 2013), misreporting (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Gøtzsche, Hróbjartsson, Marić, & Tendal, 2007; Wicherts, Bakker, & Molenaar, 2011), p-hacking and other questionable research practices (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) , the dearth of replication (Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012) , and other possible mechanisms that might render a published finding "false" (cf. Ionnidis, 2005) , are on the minds of many psychologists.
Running Head: EXPLORING SMALL, CONFIRMING BIG correct usage of NHST, while continuing to fight for the abandonment of NHST-a much loftier goal. I remain optimistic on both fronts: with greater attention on the use and misuse of NHST, hopefully we will see gradual improvement in the interpretation of NHST-based findings, as well as greater uptake of non-NHST statistical paradigms that are better suited to addressing the research questions of psychologists (e.g., Bayesian, Kruschke, 2014) .
To be clear, I wholly agree with many of the established limitations of NHST, highlighted by those cited in Cumming's proposal of TNS (2014) . I am similarly convinced of the speciousness of many-but not all-of the defenses of NHST, discussed by Schmidt and Hunter (1997) . Yet I think to advance that "significance testing never makes a useful contribution to the development of cumulative knowledge," (p. Schmidt & Hunter, 1997, p. 22) goes too far. Indeed such an absolute position is more vulnerable to counterargument; I now turn to highlighting three instances in which NHST does, in fact, help to build a cumulative and replicable psychological science.
Ways that NHST Does Help to Build a Cumulative Science of Psychology
In fairness to Cumming (2014) , he later qualifies his recommendation to abandon NHST with the following: I include "whenever possible" in my recommendations that we avoid NHST, to cover any cases in which it is not possible to calculate a relevant CI; I expect such cases to be rare, and to become rarer. (p. 26) Unfortunately, I think such instances are more common than Cumming estimates, thus greatly reducing the helpfulness of his recommendation to abandon NHST. Below are three instances in which NHST helps to build a cumulative and replicable psychological science, and there are likely others I have not considered. Running Head: EXPLORING SMALL, CONFIRMING BIG (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014; Simonsohn, Simmons, & Nelson, 2014) . Unlike detecting and correcting for publication bias in meta-analysis, or conducting nested models comparisons, p-curve isn't helpful because of any need to make dichotomous decisions. Rather, p-curve offers new possibilities for how psychologists can use exactly reported p-values, in order to assess the evidential value of a given literature (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014) , and to potentially improve on methods of meta-analytic estimation (Simonsohn, Simmons, & Nelson, 2014) .
P-curve requires the plotting of the reported exact p-values from a given study, article, author, or literature that are lesser than or equal to .05 (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014) .
Researchers can then perform a number of tests of skewness on a given p-curve, in order to test:
(1) whether a set of p values contains evidential value; (2) whether a set of p values lacks evidential value; and (3) whether a set of p values have been intensely p-hacked. This ability to assess the lack of evidential value and whether results have been p-hacked will likely prove useful when scholars are reviewing literatures, directing replication efforts, or making decisions throughout the peer-review process. Further simulations suggest that p-curve may dramatically outperform trim and fill in terms of estimation accuracy of mean effect size when publication bias is present (Simonsohn, Simmons, & Nelson, 2014) , though it remains to be seen how pcurve compares to more sophisticated methods of meta-analytic estimation (e.g., PET-PEESE,
Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2013).
Summary of the utility of NHST. Discussion of NHST within the introduction to TNS (Cumming, 2014 , and articles cited therein; e.g., Schmidt & Hunter, 1997) appears to imply that psychological science employing NHST is hardly science at all. I hope I have revealed that this claim does not hold up to closer scrutiny. NHST is indeed limited in a number of important ways Running Head: EXPLORING SMALL, CONFIRMING BIG (cf. Kline, 2004) , but it most certainly still has a role to play in cumulative and replicable psychological science. Namely, it helps researchers to make important dichotomous decisions throughout the process of data analysis. And as the advent of p-curve suggests (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014; Simonsohn, Simmons, & Nelson, 2014) , we may find even more creative and helpful uses for the output of NHST. Psychologists should therefore continue to use NHST-at least for the analytic purposes I have discussed-in addition to reporting confidence intervals and effect sizes. Running Head: EXPLORING SMALL, CONFIRMING BIG place (Simmons et al., 2011) . If a psychologists were to p-hack three studies to have significant effects, and then conduct a small-scale meta-analysis on these studies, there is a high probability that the resulting meta-analysis will support the p-hacked conclusions.
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Small-scale meta-analyses are not cumulative. Even when small-scale meta-analyses include a sprinkling of effect sizes from the literature, in addition to effect sizes from the researcher's own studies, small-scale meta-analyses do not contribute to a cumulative and replicable science. Specifically, encouraging researchers to meta-analyze their studies in conjunction with "even only one or two previous studies" (Cumming, 2014, p. 14) will inevitably lead researchers, because of their motivated reasoning or otherwise, to cherry-pick studies in the literature that complement their own results while ignoring ones that don't. Thus, in addition to p-hacking, we as a discipline will now need to be concerned with the possibility of meta-hacking.
However, small meta-analyses, in which some existing literature was included and some wasn't, will also make it more difficult for large and exhaustive meta-analyses to be conducted.
Aspiring large-scale meta-analysts will now have to screen for duplicate effect sizes in multiple small-scale meta-analyses, or ignore small-scale meta-analyses all together. In the case of the former, small-scale meta-analyses actively stall progress towards a cumulative science, whereas in the case of the latter, they simply will not contribute to a cumulative science at all. A worst case scenario may be that the additional burden of sifting through small-scale meta-analyses may discourage researchers from conducting comprehensive meta-analyses, as conducting comprehensive meta-analyses is already logistically onerous (e.g., converting between effect sizes, contacting corresponding authors when insufficient statistical information is reported, searching for unpublished literature, etc.,). Running Head: EXPLORING SMALL, CONFIRMING BIG
